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New Judges Appointed to the Tax Court of Canada and the Federal Court of Appeal

A new judge has been appointed to the Tax Court of Canada.

From the news release published by the Department of Justice:

The Honourable Peter MacKay, P.C., Q.C., M.P. for Central Nova, Minister of Justice and Attorney General of Canada, today announced the following appointment:

The Honourable Guy R. Smith, a sole practitioner in Ottawa, is appointed a judge of the Tax Court of Canada to replace Mr. Justice J.E. Hershfield, who elected to become a supernumerary judge as of June 1, 2015.

Mr. Justice Smith received a Bachelor of Arts from the University of Manitoba (Collège universitaire de St-Boniface) and a Bachelor of Arts (History) (cum laude) from the University of Ottawa in 1982. He received a Bachelor of Laws (French Common Law Program) in 1985.

Mr. Justice Smith had been a sole practitioner since 2014. Previously, he had been the Judicial Affairs Advisor for the Federal Minister of Justice and Attorney General of Canada from March 2009 to July 2014. In December 2005, he became an investment advisor with ScotiaMcLeod and in June 2007 he joined CANNACORD Capital, where he worked until 2009. He practised administrative law, constitutional law and litigation with Perley-Robertson, Hill & McDougall LLP from 1997 to 2005 and as a sole practitioner from 1991 to 1997. After he was admitted to the Bar of Ontario in 1988, he practised with the Law Office of Coderre, Smith, Barristers and Solicitors until 1991.

Mr. Justice Smith was a member of the Carleton County Law Association, the Canadian Tax Foundation and the Canadian Club of Ottawa.

Appointments to the country’s Superior Courts not only reflect the rich and diverse social fabric of our country, but also take into consideration the merit and legal excellence of each individual jurist. Through these appointments, the Government of Canada has demonstrated an awareness of the need to bring greater gender balance to the bench, to help ensure that the judiciary is more representative of Canadian society.

This appointment is effective immediately.

Additionally, two new judges were appointed to the Federal Court of Appeal:

The Honourable Peter MacKay, P.C., Q.C., M.P. for Central Nova, Minister of Justice and Attorney General of Canada, today announced the following appointments:

The Honourable Yves de Montigny, a judge of the Federal Court in Ottawa, is appointed a judge of the Federal Court of Appeal to replace Mr. Justice R. Mainville, who was appointed to the Court of Appeal of Quebec on July 1, 2014.

Mr. Justice de Montigny was appointed to the Federal Court in 2004. Prior to his appointment, he had held various positions in the Department of Justice Canada, including those of Chief of Staff to the Minister, Senior Advisor to the Deputy Minister, and Chief Legal Counsel, Public Law Group. He had also been Director General of Constitutional Strategy and Plans at the Privy Council Office. As well, he served as Special Advisor to the Executive Council of the Government of Quebec and Counsel in the Quebec Ministry of Justice. His main areas of practice included constitutional law, administrative law, criminal law and international and public law. He had been a professor at the University of Ottawa, Faculty of Law (1982-1997), and a lecturer at the École du Barreau du Québec and the Faculty of Law and Faculty of Continuing Education of the Université de Montréal.

Mr. Justice de Montigny received a Bachelor of Laws in 1978 and a Master of Laws in 1979, both from l’Université de Montréal. As well, he holds a Masters in Political Philosophy from Oxford University. He was admitted to the Bar of Quebec in 1983.

The Honourable Mary J.L. Gleason, a judge of the Federal Court in Ottawa, is appointed a judge of the Federal Court of Appeal to fill a new position created by Bill-C36.

Madam Justice Gleason was appointed to the Federal Court in 2011. Prior to her appointment, she had been a senior partner with Norton Rose LLP (formerly Ogilvy Renault LLP), where she practised labour and employment law in Ottawa after being admitted to the Bar of Ontario in 1986. Madam Justice Gleason held a number of management positions within her firm, including that of co-managing partner of its Ottawa office and Ottawa Chair of its Employment and Labour Group. She frequently guest lectured at the University of Ottawa and taught a course in employment law at the Faculty of Law of the University of Ottawa. She has written numerous articles and regularly presented papers to conferences hosted by a variety of organizations, including the Law Society of Upper Canada, the Canadian Bar Association, Insight, Lancaster House, the Council of Industrial Relations Executives of the Conference Board of Canada and the Canadian Association of Counsel to Employers (CACE), an association of Canadian management-side labour and employment practitioners. Justice Gleason was a founding member and past president of CACE. She also was active in the Canadian Bar Association and the Ottawa Human Resource Professionals’ Association, where she held the portfolio of Government Affairs Liaison on its Board of Directors for a number of years. Prior to her appointment she was a member of the Canada Industrial Relations Board’s Client Consultation Committee and the Federal Court Labour Law, Human Rights, Privacy and Access Review Liaison Group. She was recognized as a leading labour and employment practitioner by Best Lawyers in Canada, L’Expert, PLC Which Lawyer?, Guide to the World’s Leading Labour and Employment Lawyers, and Canadian HR Reporter’s Canada’s Employment Law Directory.

Madam Justice Gleason, from Regina, Saskatchewan, lived most of her earlier years in Calgary and then pursued her studies in Ottawa and Halifax. She received a Bachelor of Arts (Honours) in History (summa cum laude) from the University of Ottawa in 1981and a Bachelor of Laws from Dalhousie University in 1984.

Appointments to the country’s Superior Courts not only reflect the rich and diverse social fabric of our country, but also take into consideration the merit and legal excellence of each individual jurist. Through these appointments, the Government of Canada has demonstrated an awareness of the need to bring greater gender balance to the bench, to help ensure that the judiciary is more representative of Canadian society.

These appointments are effective immediately.

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New Judges Appointed to the Tax Court of Canada and the Federal Court of Appeal

Fairmont: OCA Dismisses Crown’s Appeal in Rectification Case

The Ontario Court of Appeal has dismissed the Crown’s appeal in Fairmont Hotels Inc. v. A.G. (Canada) (2015 ONCA 441).

In Fairmont (2014 ONSC 7302), the taxpayer was successful on an application for rectification of certain corporate transactions (see our previous post here).

On appeal, the Crown argued that the lower court had misapplied the test for rectification because the parties had not determined the specific manner in which their intention to avoid tax would be carried out. In the Crown’s view, the lower court’s judgment sanctioned retroactive tax planning.

The Court of Appeal disagreed:

[8]          In these circumstances, relying on this court’s decision in Juliar, the application judge held that the respondent was entitled to rectify the relevant corporate resolutions to correct the mistaken share redemptions.  This result, the application judge noted, would avoid the imposition of an unintended tax burden that the respondent had sought to avoid from the outset, as well as an unintended tax revenue windfall to the CRA arising from the mistaken share redemptions.

[9]          On the factual findings of the application judge, set out above, and the binding authority of Juliar, we see no basis for intervention with the application judge’s discretionary decision to grant rectification.

[10]       Juliar is a binding decision of this court.  It does not require that the party seeking rectification must have determined the precise mechanics or means by which the party’s settled intention to achieve a specific tax outcome would be realized. Juliar holds, in effect, that the critical requirement for rectification is proof of a continuing specific intention to undertake a transaction or transactions on a particular tax basis.

[11]       In this case, on the application judge’s findings, the respondent had a specific and unwavering intention from the outset of its dealings with Legacy to ensure that the Legacy-related transactions were tax neutral and, to that end, that no redemptions of the relevant preference shares should occur.  Nonetheless, by mistake, the redemptions were authorized by corporate resolutions.

[12]       Contrary to the appellant’s argument, in these circumstances, it was unnecessary that the respondent prove that it had determined to use a specific transactional device – loans – to achieve the intended tax result.  That the respondent mistakenly failed to employ an appropriate transactional device to achieve the intended tax result does not alter the nature of the respondent’s settled tax plan: tax neutrality in its dealings with Legacy and no redemptions of the preference shares in question.

[13]       At the end of the day, therefore, Juliar and the application judge’s factual findings, described above, are dispositive of this appeal.  It is not open to a single panel of this court to depart from a binding decision of this court.

[14]       The appeal is dismissed. …

The Court of Appeal’s decision in Fairmont is an important affirmation of the result and reasoning in Juliar v. A.G. (Canada) ((2000), 50 O.R. (3d) 728 (Ont. C.A.)) (Dentons was counsel for the successful taxpayer).

Recently, the Crown has been aggressively arguing in rectification cases that Juliar was either wrongly decided or should be narrowly applied (two Alberta cases have followed this argument – see, for example, Graymar Equipment (2008) Inc. v A.G. (Canada) (2014 ABQB 154) and Harvest Operations Corp. v. A.G. (Canada) (2015 ABQB 237)).

However, in TCR Holding Corporation v. Ontario (2010 ONCA 233) and Fairmont, the Ontario Court of Appeal has clearly rejected those arguments. This should put an end to the Crown’s arguments about Juliar – at least in Ontario.

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Fairmont: OCA Dismisses Crown’s Appeal in Rectification Case

Kruger: FX Derivatives Gains/Losses Taxed Only When Realized

In Kruger Incorporated v. The Queen (2015 TCC 119), the Tax Court held that the taxpayer could not value its foreign exchange options contracts on a mark-to-market basis, with the result that certain losses were not deductible by the taxpayer in a year. The Kruger case is another recent judgment of the Tax Court in the developing law on the Canadian tax treatment of financial derivative products (see George Weston Limited v. The Queen (2015 TCC 42)).

Facts

Kruger’s core business was manufacturing newsprint, paper-coated products and tissue paper. In the 1980s, Kruger started trading in foreign currency contracts, and over time these activities grew to involve more than 10 employees trading in currency, bonds and securities.

In 1997, Kruger was advised that it was required to start reporting its financial trading activities on a mark-to-market basis, which required the recognition of any change in market value in a year as an income gain or loss.

In 1998, certain of Kruger’s U.S. currency options contracts were “under water” due to fluctuations in the Canada-U.S. exchange rate. Accordingly, for its 1998 tax year, Kruger claimed losses totaling $91,104,379 from a business of trading in derivatives. The CRA reassessed to deny the deduction of $91,104,379, but excluded from income the amount of $18,696,881, which Kruger had included as the amortized portion of the net of premium income and expenses for the foreign exchange options contracts. The CRA also included the amount of $91,104,379 in Kruger’s taxable capital for the purposes of the large corporations tax (which has now been generally repealed).

Kruger appealed the reassessment on the basis that, in accordance with section 9 of the Act, it was entitled to value its foreign exchange options contracts using the mark-to-market method, and argued in the alternative that its foreign exchange options contracts were inventory and were to be valued at the lower of cost and fair market value under subsection 10(1) of the Act.

Analysis

The Court reviewed the key Canadian judicial authorities regarding the test for determining income under the Act, including Friedberg v. The Queen ([1993] 4 S.C.R. 285), Canderel Limited v. The Queen ([1998] 1 S.C.R. 147), Friesen v. The Queen ([1995] 3 S.C.R. 103). The Court referred to the oft-cited principles from Canderel that the determination of profit is a question of law, and a taxpayer is free to adopt any method for determining profit that is not inconsistent with the provisions of the Act, case law, and well-accepted business principles. Once the taxpayer has shown that it has provided an accurate picture of income, the onus shifts to the CRA to establish that the amount is not an accurate picture of profit or that another method would provide a more accurate picture.

The Court noted there were no provisions in the Act that required or authorized the valuation of property on a mark-to-market basis. Further, there is an important difference between financial and tax accounting:

[109] Financial accounting … is concerned with constructing a picture of profit from year to year in a consistent manner for the benefit of the audience for whom financial statements are prepared: shareholders, investors, lenders, etc. … FASB views mark to market valuation for the same reasons: to better enable investors, creditors and others to assess the entity’s performance. …

[110] Tax accounting normally is not overly concerned with the past; it wants a picture of income for a particular year and … the methodology used to calculate income in one year may be different from that used in an earlier year. … statements for tax purposes are solely concerned with the computation of income in achieving an accurate picture of income for the particular taxation year.

The Court noted that sections 142.2 to 142.5 of the Act require financial institutions and investment dealers to use mark-to-market, but these rules did not apply to Kruger. The Court stated,

[114] Mark to market accounting … would compel a taxpayer to include any loss or gain in value of the property at year-end in income for the year. This may be appropriate for financial statements for reasons discussed earlier. But, for income tax purposes, the taxpayer may be compelled to include an amount in income where there is no clear statutory language requiring him or her to do so. The realization principle is basic to Canadian tax law. It provides certainty of a gain or loss. Without some support of the statutory language or a compelling interpretation tool it ought not to be cast aside.

The Court also noted a difficulty in respect of the market prices for the foreign exchange options contracts, namely that such prices were formulated by the counter-parties to the contracts (i.e., Kruger’s banks). The Court held there was a “probably inconsistency in values” depending on the pricing method used by the counter-party.

In respect of Kruger’s alternative argument that the options contracts were inventory, the Court determined that Kruger was carrying on a business of speculating on foreign exchange currency options that was separate from its manufacturing business. Further, the Court determined that the foreign exchange options contracts were financial liabilities when such contracts were written by Kruger, and property (i.e., inventory) when purchased by Kruger.

The Court allowed the appeal only to permit Kruger to value its purchased foreign exchange options contracts in accordance with subsection 10(1) of the Act (which would have an effect similar to mark-to-market accounting in that the contracts would be valued each year at the lower of cost and fair market value). Additionally, the amount of $91,104,379 was to be added to Kruger’s taxable capital for the purposes of the large corporations tax

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Kruger: FX Derivatives Gains/Losses Taxed Only When Realized

Two New Judges Appointed to Tax Court of Canada

Two new judges have been appointed to the Tax Court of Canada.

From the news release published by the Department of Justice:

The Honourable Peter MacKay, P.C., Q.C., M.P. for Central Nova, Minister of Justice and Attorney General of Canada, today announced the following appointments:

The Honourable Don R. Sommerfeldt, a counsel with Dentons Canada LLP in Edmonton, is appointed a judge of the Tax Court of Canada, to replace Madam Justice G. Sheridan who resigned effective May 1, 2014.

Mr. Justice Sommerfeldt received a Bachelor of Arts and Science from the University of Lethbridge in 1972 and a Bachelor of Laws from the University of Alberta in 1977.  He also received a Master of Arts from Brigham Young University in 1974 and a Master of Laws from Cornell University in 2004.  He was admitted to the Bar of Alberta in 1978 and to the bar of New York in 2004.

Mr. Justice Sommerfeldt has been with Dentons Canada LLP (formerly Fraser Milner Casgrain LLP) since 2000.  Prior to that, he practised taxation, estate planning and pensions with Edward A. Zelinsky Professional Corporation; Cruickshank Karvellas; Milner Fenerty; the Department of National Revenue (Rulings Directorate) while on secondment from Milner & Steer.

Mr. Justice Sommerfeldt is a member of the following associations: the Canadian Tax Foundation and is a past governor; the Society of trust and Estate Practitioners, the Canadian Bar Association; the Canadian Association of Law Teachers; the International Fiscal Association; and the New York State Bar Association.

The Honourable Henry A. Visser, a lawyer with McInnes Cooper in Halifax, is appointed a judge of the Tax Court of Canada, to replace Madam Justice D. Campbell, who elected supernumerary status as of June 19, 2015.  This appointment is effective June 19, 2015.

Mr. Justice Visser received a Bachelor of Commerce from Dalhousie University in 1988 and a Bachelor of Laws from the Dalhousie Law School (now the Schulich School of Law) in 1994.  He was admitted to the Bar of Nova Scotia in 1995 and to Prince Edward Island in 1998.

Mr. Justice Visser has been a lawyer with the firm McInnes Cooper since 1997 and became a partner in 2003.  His main areas of practice were tax law, corporate law, commercial law, labour law and employment law.  He was employed with Martin Visser and Sons, farming and export business, from June 1995 to May 1997.

These appointments are effective immediately, unless indicated otherwise.

Two New Judges Appointed to Tax Court of Canada

Mac’s: Quebec CA Affirms Denial of Rectification

In Mac’s Convenience Stores Inc. v. Canada (2015 QCCA 837), the Quebec Court of Appeal affirmed a lower court decision (2012 QCCS 2745) denying rectification of corporate resolutions that had declared a dividend that unintentionally put the company offside the “thin-cap” rules in subsections 18(4)-(8) of the Income Tax Act.

Facts

Mac’s, an Ontario corporation, was a wholly-owned subsidiary of Couche-Tard Inc. (“CTI”). In April 2005, Mac’s borrowed $185 million from Sidel Corporation, a related Delaware corporation.

In April 2006, Mac’s participated in several transactions with various related entities, including the declaration of a $136 million dividend on the common shares held by CTI. A similar series of transactions had been undertaken in 2001. However, in 2006, Mac’s professional advisors failed or forgot to take proper account of the $185 million owed by Mac’s to Sidel.

While the $136 million dividend itself was generally without tax consequences, the dividend had the effect of putting Mac’s offside the (then) 2:1 ratio in the “thin-cap” rules in the Income Tax Act. This resulted in the reduction of deductible interest paid by Mac’s to Sidel in the years following the dividend payment (i.e., 2006, 2007 and 2008).

Rectification

After Mac’s was reassessed by the CRA to disallow the interest deduction, Mac’s sought rectification of the corporate resolution declaring the dividend, and additionally sought to substitute a reduction of its stated capital and the distribution of cash to CTI. This would have had the same effect of paying an amount to CTI while maintaining the proper ratio for interest deductibility.

The Quebec Superior Court dismissed the application on the basis that the Mac’s directors never had any specific discussions regarding the deductibility of interest on the Sidel loan after the payment of the dividend. The various steps in the 2006 transactions reflected the intentions of the parties, and thus there was no divergence between the parties agreement and the documents carrying out the transactions.

Appeal

The taxpayer appealed to the Quebec Court of Appeal. The Court described the taxpayer’s position as not invoking any error in the lower court judgment but simply alleging that, if the taxpayer’s advisors had made a mistake, then the lower court decision must be reversed on the basis of the Supreme Court of Canada’s decision in Quebec v. Services Environnementaux AES Inc. (2013 SCC 65) (“AES“) (see our previous post on AES here).

The Court of Appeal stated that it understood the Supreme Court’s decision in AES to stand for the proposition that parties who undertake legitimate corporate transactions for the purpose of avoiding, deferring or minimizing tax and who commit an error in carrying out such transactions may correct the error(s) in order to achieve the tax results as intended and agreed upon. The Court of Appeal cautioned that AES does not sanction retroactive tax planning.

In the present case, the Court of Appeal held there was no common intention regarding the “thin-cap” implications of the dividend payment, and thus there was no agreement that should be given effect by the courts.

The Court of Appeal held there was no error by the lower court and dismissed the taxpayer’s appeal.

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Mac’s: Quebec CA Affirms Denial of Rectification

Baytex: ABQB Grants Rectification

In Baytex Energy Ltd. et  al. v. The Queen (2015 ABQB 278), the Alberta Court of Queen’s Bench considered whether rectification and/or rescission were available to address mistakes that could result in the taxpayer being taxed on additional resource income of $135 million for 2003-2006 and $528 million for 2007-2010.

The Court determined that the requirements for rectification had been satisfied and thus granted the rectification of certain documents to accord with the parties’ original intention.

Facts

Baytex Energy Trust (the “Trust”) was a publicly-traded mutual fund trust (the Trust later converted to Baytex Energy Corp. (“BEC”), a publicly-traded dividend-paying corporation). The Trust wholly-owned Baytex Energy Ltd. (“BEL”), which owned and operated oil and gas properties prior to transferring the properties to Baytex Energy Partnership on January 1, 2010.

The Baytex companies were subject to the pre-2007 oil and gas royalty regime in the Income Tax Act, which required certain additional resource income for an oil and gas producer (referred to in the judgment as “Phantom Income”) and denied certain deductions for provincial Crown royalties and taxes. A 25% resource allowance was available to the producer. The Phantom Income could be transferred by the producer to another party, and a non-deductible and off-setting reimbursement would be made back to the producer. In this case, BEL and the Trust agreed that BEL would transfer 99% of its income and cash flow to the Trust.

In the Budget of February 18, 2003, the federal government announced the phase-out of the oil and gas royalty regime and the elimination of the regime as of January 1, 2007.

Parties’ Agreements

BEL and the Trust executed a Net Profits Interest Agreement (the “Original Agreement”) in September 2003 for the transfer of income and the off-setting reimbursement. However, the written terms of the Original Agreement failed to address the transfer of Phantom Income. A subsequent agreement (the “Collateral Agreement”) – not all of the terms of which were reduced to writing – addressed the transfer of Phantom Income.

The parties intended that the transfer and reimbursement would cease effective January 1, 2007 because of the elimination of the oil and gas royalty regime in the Income Tax Act.

However, from January 1, 2007 to December 31, 2010, the parties continued the practice of transferring and reimbursing the Phantom Income. When this error was initially discovered in 2008, the Baytex companies’ tax professionals advised that the Original Agreement should be amended to provide for the reimbursement beyond 2006 to be consistent with the practice of the parties. The Baytex companies were told this amendment would have no adverse tax consequences. Based on this advice, the parties entered into an Amended Agreement.

The CRA reviewed the Baytex companies’ arrangements and concluded that an additional $135 million was taxable income to BEL for 2003-2006, and that the Trust earned an additional $528 million of taxable income for 2007-2010.

Rectification/Rescission

The Baytex companies sought rectification of the agreements. The CRA did not oppose the rectification of the agreements for the pre-2007 period, but did oppose the rectification for the post-2006 period on the basis that the Baytex companies had intentionally amended the Original Agreement, based on professional advice, to reflect the practice of transfer and reimbursement, and thus the parties mistaken assumption about the tax consequences would not meet the test for rectification. The taxpayers argued that the evidence (which consisted of two affidavits of BEC’s Chief Financial Officer) established that the parties always intended to transfer and reimburse the Phantom Income and that no transfers would occur after January 1, 2007.

The Court considered the authorities on rectification and concluded that the test for granting rectification had been met. The uncontroverted evidence was that the parties’ common intention was to transfer BEL’s income to the Trust, and that this practice would cease as of January 1, 2007. The Original Agreement and the Amended Agreement were inconsistent with this common intention. The precise form of the corrected agreement was not in dispute. And there were no other considerations that would limit/prevent the availability of rectification. Accordingly, the Court granted the rectification.

While this determination was sufficient to dispose of the application, the Court did go on to consider whether, if the Court was wrong on rectification, rescission was available to the parties. The Court held that the Amended Agreement triggered an unintended tax consequence that constituted a fundamental mistake that went to the root of the contract. The Court concluded that rescission was available to rescind the Amended Agreement, which would restore the parties to their Original Agreement, which the Crown had agreed should be rectified.

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Baytex: ABQB Grants Rectification

Ironside: TCC Orders Hearing of Question on Rule 58 Motion

In Ironside v. The Queen (2015 TCC 116), the Tax Court allowed the Crown’s Rule 58 motion for a determination of a question of law before the hearing, namely whether the taxpayer was estopped from litigating an issue that had been adjudicated in an earlier Tax Court decision.

In the prior case (Ironside v. The Queen (2013 TCC 339)), the taxpayer had incurred legal and professional fees to defend himself against allegations of committing improper disclosures after being charged in June 2001 by the Alberta Securities Commission. The taxpayer sought to deduct such fees in the 2003 and 2004 tax years.

The Tax Court concluded that the taxpayer’s legal and professional fees had not been incurred to gain or produce income from his chartered accounting business, rather such expenses were personal in nature and were incurred to protect his reputation in the oil and gas industry. The Tax Court dismissed the taxpayer’s appeal.

Subsequently, the taxpayer sought to make the same deductions in the 2007, 2008 and 2009 tax years. The CRA reassessed to deny the deductions, and the taxpayer again appealed to the Tax Court.

In its Reply, the Crown raised the issue of whether “the appeal or a portion of it is barred by application of the doctrine of issue estoppel or is otherwise an abuse of the process of the Court”. The Crown then brought a motion for an order pursuant to Rule 58 of the Tax Court of Canada Rules (General Procedure) for a determination of a question prior to the appeal:

Whether the Appellant is barred from litigating within proceeding 2014-1619(IT)G whether the legal and professional fees paid to defend himself in Alberta Securities Commission proceedings and the subsequent appeal are deductible as amounts incurred to gain or produce income from a business or property, on the basis that the characterization of such fees has been previously adjudicated upon and therefore the doctrines of issue estoppel and or abuse of process operate to bar re-litigation of the issue.

The Tax Court noted that Rule 58 contains a two-step process. At the first stage, the Tax Court must determine whether the question posed by the moving party is an appropriate one that should be heard in a subsequent hearing (the second stage).

At the first stage, three elements must exist:

  1. The question proposed must be a question of law, fact, or mixed fact and law;
  2. The question must be raised in the pleadings; and
  3. The determination of the question may dispose of all or part of the appeal, may substantially shorten the hearing, or may result in substantial cost saving.

If all of these elements are present, the Court may set a hearing of the proposed question before a motions judge prior to the hearing of the appeal.

In the present case, the Tax Court held that all three requirements were satisfied. The Court stated,

[12] Clearly, there is the potential that a determination of this question may, according to the materials I have before me and the submissions I heard, dispose of part of the appeal and I need only be satisfied that it “may” so dispose of some of the appeal. I do not have to be absolutely convinced that it will do so in order to refer the question to a Stage Two determination prior to the hearing. If part of the appeal is disposed of, it follows that the proceeding will be substantially shortened. This is precisely the type of question that Rule 58 is meant to target.

The Tax Court ordered that the Crown’s question be set down for a hearing for determination by a motions judge and that certain evidence be presented at the determination (i.e., the pleadings from both appeals, and the Tax Court’s decision in Ironside v. The Queen (2013 TCC 339)).

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Ironside: TCC Orders Hearing of Question on Rule 58 Motion

Crowdfunding: Update From the CRA

In a short technical interpretation (CRA Document 2015-0579031I7 “Crowdfunding” (April 1, 2015)), the CRA has restated its views on the tax treatment of amounts raised via crowdfunding arrangements (see our previous post here).

The CRA stated that amounts received by a taxpayer under a crowdfunding arrangement could represent a loan, capital contribution, gift, income or a combination thereof. The CRA will evaluate each situation on a case-by-case basis.

The CRA stated that, in its view, where funds are received by a taxpayer for the development of a new product and the taxpayer carries on a business or profession, the funds will be taxable income unless the taxpayer can establish that such funds are a loan, capital contribution or other form of equity. The CRA noted that any reasonable costs related to the crowdfunding arrangements would likely be deductible in computing that income.

The CRA noted that, in Canada, crowdfunding activities typically do not involve the issuance of securities, but that some securities regulators may be considering changes to existing regulatory rules. The CRA will evaluate the income tax consequences if such regulatory changes take place.

Finally, the CRA noted that the subject of crowdfunding is briefly addressed in Folio S3-F9-C1 “Lottery Winnings, Miscellaneous Receipts, and Income (and Losses) from Crime” (April 3, 2015) in respect of whether such amounts may be a gift by a donor. The CRA provided an example from the Folio:

Example 2

Assume a business uses crowdfunding as a method of raising funds for the development of a new product and the contributors do not receive any form of equity. The amounts received by the business would be included in its income pursuant to subsection 9(1). 

Taxpayers who seek and obtain crowdfunding (for business and non-business purposes) should be aware of the potential tax implications, particularly in light of fact-specific results and the CRA’s evolving views on the subject.

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Crowdfunding: Update From the CRA

FCA: TCC Erred in Awarding Costs on Basis of Pre-Appeal Conduct

The Tax Court has in recent years demonstrated a willingness to use cost awards to control the parties’ conduct. This includes awarding lump-sum amounts, which may depart markedly from the “tariff” amounts described in Tariff B of Schedule II of the Tax Court’s General Procedure Rules. Further, the Court has wrestled with the weight – if any – that the parties’ conduct prior to an appeal should carry in respect of a cost award.

In Martin v. The Queen (2013 TCC 38), the taxpayer successfully challenged a section 160 assessment in respect of certain amounts paid to her by her spouse. There was evidence the auditor had deliberately misled the taxpayer during an audit, and the taxpayer had spent considerable time and money enduring the audit and objection process before her ultimate success in the Tax Court.

On the issue of costs, the taxpayer asked for (i) solicitor-client costs, or (ii) a fixed amount under Rule 147, or (iii) the tariff costs. The Crown argued that only tariff costs should be awarded. Describing the case as “very unusual, difficult, and hopefully exceptional, case”, the Tax Court considered the pre-appeal conduct of the CRA (among other factors) and awarded the taxpayer a lump sum amount of $10,635 (2014 TCC 50).

The Tax Court repeated its view that costs may be awarded against the Crown where it pursues a meritless case in the Tax Court:

[21] … There are perhaps some arguments and some cases that the Canada Revenue Agency just should not pursue. The Crown is not a private party. By reassessing a taxpayer and failing to resolve its objection, the Crown is forcing its citizen/taxpayers to take it to Court. If the Crown’s position does not have a reasonable degree of sustainability, and is in fact entirely rejected, it is entirely appropriate that the Crown should be aware it is proceeding subject to the risk of a possibly increased award of costs against it if it is unsuccessful.

The Crown appealed and the taxpayer cross-appealed.

The Federal Court of Appeal noted that a discretionary cost award should only be set aside if the judge made an error in principle or if the award is plainly wrong (see Hamilton v. Open Window Bakery (2004 SCC 9) and Sun Indalex Finance LLC v. United Steelworkers (2013 SCC 6)).

In the Court of Appeal, the Crown alleged that the Tax Court judge had made an error of fact  (i.e., the finding that the CRA auditor had been deceitful in providing incorrect information), and an error of law (i.e., relying on the auditor’s deceitful conduct as a basis for awarding increased costs).

On the first issue, the Court held there was no error of law because the Crown admitted the auditor had engaged in deceitful behavior. On the second issue, the Court noted that conduct that occurs prior to a proceeding may be taken into account if such conduct unduly and unnecessarily prolongs the proceeding (see Merchant v. Canada (2001 FCA 19) and Canada v. Landry (2010 FCA 135)). However, the Court stated that the audit and objection stages are not a “proceeding”, which is defined in section 2 of the Rules as an appeal or reference. Accordingly, the Court stated, “the Judge erred in principle in allowing an amount incurred in respect of costs unrelated to the appeal which were incurred at the objection stage. Those expenses, by definition, were not incurred as part of the appeal ‘proceeding'”.

In respect of the cross-appeal, the Court of Appeal considered whether the lower court had erred in declining to award solicitor-client costs. The Court held there was no error because such costs could not include pre-appeal costs, and even if such costs could be awarded, solicitor-client costs are awarded only where there has been reprehensible, scandalous or outrageous misconduct connected with the litigation (see also Scavuzzo v. The Queen (2006 TCC 90)).

The Court allowed the appeal, dismissed the cross-appeal, set aside the lower court’s cost award and substituted a cost award of $4,800 plus disbursements and taxes (2015 FCA 95).

The Court of Appeal decision in Martin may have failed to address all relevant provisions of Rule 147, which arguably provide for very broad discretion for awarding costs. For example, paragraph 147(3)(j) of the Tax Court Rules states the Court may consider “any other matter relevant to the question of costs”.

The Court of Appeal’s decision also raises an issue regarding the circumstances in which deceitful pre-appeal conduct may unduly or unnecessarily prolong a proceeding – wouldn’t such a hindrance follow in every case of deceitful conduct by a party?

Further, the Court of Appeal appeared particularly concerned that the taxpayer’s pre-appeal expenses could not be addressed in the cost award, but it seems clear that the Tax Court had exercised its discretion to award a lump sum based not only on the quantum of the pre-appeal costs but on the existence of the auditor’s deceitful behavior and the Crown’s obstinate approach and refusal to resolve – at any stage – an uncomplicated tax dispute.

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FCA: TCC Erred in Awarding Costs on Basis of Pre-Appeal Conduct

Loss Determinations: No Time Like the Present

Under subsection 152(1.1) of the Income Tax Act, a taxpayer may apply for a determination of losses for a tax year.

A taxpayer typically requests a loss determination after the CRA has issued a nil assessment. This is because no objection may be filed against a nil assessment, and thus one of the ways to challenge the adjustments underlying the nil assessment (i.e., the adjustments to losses or other tax balances) is to force the issuance of a Notice of Determination/Redetermination of Losses, which then triggers the right to file a Notice of Objection. If the taxpayer does not request a loss determination, the taxpayer may challenge the quantum of the losses in a subsequent year in which the losses are applied.

However, the timing of the loss determination request is an important issue – if the losses cannot be applied until several years after the tax year at issue, this could create uncertainty and additional (and perhaps burdensome) record-keeping requirements for the taxpayer.

This issue was considered in CRA Document No. 2014-0550351C6 (November 18, 2014), in which the CRA was asked whether it would issue a determination of loss to a taxpayer who requests one upon filing of its return (i.e., rather than at the later time when a nil assessment is issued).

Under subsection 152(1.1), where the CRA ascertains the amount of a taxpayer’s non-capital loss or net capital loss (or certain other losses), and the taxpayer has not reported that amount on the taxpayer’s return, the taxpayer may request that the CRA determine the amount of the loss and the CRA must make that determination and send a notice of determination to the taxpayer.

In the present case, the CRA stated that subsection 152(1.1) provides that two requirements must be satisfied before a loss determination may be made: First, the CRA must ascertain the amount of the taxpayer’s loss to be an amount that differs from the amount reported by the taxpayer in its return, and (ii) the taxpayer requests the loss determination.

In Inco Limited v. The Queen (2004 TCC 373), the Tax Court stated,

[13] … subsection 152(1.1) of the Act clearly contemplates and establishes a procedure involving sequential steps or events that must take place in order for there to be a valid loss determination. These steps are: (a) the Minister ascertains the amount of a taxpayer’s non-capital loss for a taxation year in an amount that differs from the one reported in the taxpayer’s income tax return; (b) the taxpayer requests that the Minister determine the amount of the loss; (c) the Minister thereupon determines the amount of the loss and issues a notice of loss determination to the taxpayer.

We also note that, in a previous technical interpretation (CRA Document No. 2011-0401241I7 “Adjustments outside the normal assessment period” (September 7, 2011)), the CRA stated,

Paragraph 4 of Interpretation Bulletin IT-512 “Determination and redetermination of losses” also clarifies the CRA’s position on the requirements for a loss determination to be issued:

4. Where at the initial assessing stage or as a consequence of a reassessment arising from an audit or other investigative action by the Department the Minister ascertains a loss in an amount other than that reported by the taxpayer, a notice of assessment or reassessment (including a notice of “nil” assessment or reassessment) will be issued with an explanation of the changes. As well, the notice will inform the taxpayer that upon request the Minister will make a determination of the loss so ascertained and issue a notice of determination/redetermination. In this context, the Minister will not be considered to have ascertained that the amount of a loss differs from an amount reported by the taxpayer where the difference fully reflects a change requested by the taxpayer as a result of amended or new information.

Therefore, where the difference in the amount of a loss for the year reflects an amendment by the taxpayer, this is not considered to be “ascertained” by the Minister, and therefore, on its own, does not meet the requirements for subsection 152(1.1) loss determination. Therefore, in this case, because the taxpayer is requesting the changes and the Minister would not be “ascertaining” the amount of the loss, the taxpayer cannot request a loss determination.

In CRA Document No. 2014-0550351C6, the CRA restated that, if it accepts the amount of the loss reported in the taxpayer’s return, the CRA has not ascertained the loss to be an amount that differs from the amount reported in the return. Accordingly, the first condition of subsection 152(1.1) would not be met, and the CRA could not issue a loss determination at the time the return was filed.

In the CRA’s view, the Act would need to be amended to allow for the issuance of a loss determination at the time the taxpayer files its return.

In other words, the present is no time to request a loss determination. Unless the Act is amended to alter the timing requirements, such a request must wait until the time at which the CRA determines the taxpayer’s loss to be an amount different from the amount reported in the return.

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Loss Determinations: No Time Like the Present