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New Judges Appointed to the Tax Court of Canada and the Federal Court of Appeal

A new judge has been appointed to the Tax Court of Canada.

From the news release published by the Department of Justice:

The Honourable Peter MacKay, P.C., Q.C., M.P. for Central Nova, Minister of Justice and Attorney General of Canada, today announced the following appointment:

The Honourable Guy R. Smith, a sole practitioner in Ottawa, is appointed a judge of the Tax Court of Canada to replace Mr. Justice J.E. Hershfield, who elected to become a supernumerary judge as of June 1, 2015.

Mr. Justice Smith received a Bachelor of Arts from the University of Manitoba (Collège universitaire de St-Boniface) and a Bachelor of Arts (History) (cum laude) from the University of Ottawa in 1982. He received a Bachelor of Laws (French Common Law Program) in 1985.

Mr. Justice Smith had been a sole practitioner since 2014. Previously, he had been the Judicial Affairs Advisor for the Federal Minister of Justice and Attorney General of Canada from March 2009 to July 2014. In December 2005, he became an investment advisor with ScotiaMcLeod and in June 2007 he joined CANNACORD Capital, where he worked until 2009. He practised administrative law, constitutional law and litigation with Perley-Robertson, Hill & McDougall LLP from 1997 to 2005 and as a sole practitioner from 1991 to 1997. After he was admitted to the Bar of Ontario in 1988, he practised with the Law Office of Coderre, Smith, Barristers and Solicitors until 1991.

Mr. Justice Smith was a member of the Carleton County Law Association, the Canadian Tax Foundation and the Canadian Club of Ottawa.

Appointments to the country’s Superior Courts not only reflect the rich and diverse social fabric of our country, but also take into consideration the merit and legal excellence of each individual jurist. Through these appointments, the Government of Canada has demonstrated an awareness of the need to bring greater gender balance to the bench, to help ensure that the judiciary is more representative of Canadian society.

This appointment is effective immediately.

Additionally, two new judges were appointed to the Federal Court of Appeal:

The Honourable Peter MacKay, P.C., Q.C., M.P. for Central Nova, Minister of Justice and Attorney General of Canada, today announced the following appointments:

The Honourable Yves de Montigny, a judge of the Federal Court in Ottawa, is appointed a judge of the Federal Court of Appeal to replace Mr. Justice R. Mainville, who was appointed to the Court of Appeal of Quebec on July 1, 2014.

Mr. Justice de Montigny was appointed to the Federal Court in 2004. Prior to his appointment, he had held various positions in the Department of Justice Canada, including those of Chief of Staff to the Minister, Senior Advisor to the Deputy Minister, and Chief Legal Counsel, Public Law Group. He had also been Director General of Constitutional Strategy and Plans at the Privy Council Office. As well, he served as Special Advisor to the Executive Council of the Government of Quebec and Counsel in the Quebec Ministry of Justice. His main areas of practice included constitutional law, administrative law, criminal law and international and public law. He had been a professor at the University of Ottawa, Faculty of Law (1982-1997), and a lecturer at the École du Barreau du Québec and the Faculty of Law and Faculty of Continuing Education of the Université de Montréal.

Mr. Justice de Montigny received a Bachelor of Laws in 1978 and a Master of Laws in 1979, both from l’Université de Montréal. As well, he holds a Masters in Political Philosophy from Oxford University. He was admitted to the Bar of Quebec in 1983.

The Honourable Mary J.L. Gleason, a judge of the Federal Court in Ottawa, is appointed a judge of the Federal Court of Appeal to fill a new position created by Bill-C36.

Madam Justice Gleason was appointed to the Federal Court in 2011. Prior to her appointment, she had been a senior partner with Norton Rose LLP (formerly Ogilvy Renault LLP), where she practised labour and employment law in Ottawa after being admitted to the Bar of Ontario in 1986. Madam Justice Gleason held a number of management positions within her firm, including that of co-managing partner of its Ottawa office and Ottawa Chair of its Employment and Labour Group. She frequently guest lectured at the University of Ottawa and taught a course in employment law at the Faculty of Law of the University of Ottawa. She has written numerous articles and regularly presented papers to conferences hosted by a variety of organizations, including the Law Society of Upper Canada, the Canadian Bar Association, Insight, Lancaster House, the Council of Industrial Relations Executives of the Conference Board of Canada and the Canadian Association of Counsel to Employers (CACE), an association of Canadian management-side labour and employment practitioners. Justice Gleason was a founding member and past president of CACE. She also was active in the Canadian Bar Association and the Ottawa Human Resource Professionals’ Association, where she held the portfolio of Government Affairs Liaison on its Board of Directors for a number of years. Prior to her appointment she was a member of the Canada Industrial Relations Board’s Client Consultation Committee and the Federal Court Labour Law, Human Rights, Privacy and Access Review Liaison Group. She was recognized as a leading labour and employment practitioner by Best Lawyers in Canada, L’Expert, PLC Which Lawyer?, Guide to the World’s Leading Labour and Employment Lawyers, and Canadian HR Reporter’s Canada’s Employment Law Directory.

Madam Justice Gleason, from Regina, Saskatchewan, lived most of her earlier years in Calgary and then pursued her studies in Ottawa and Halifax. She received a Bachelor of Arts (Honours) in History (summa cum laude) from the University of Ottawa in 1981and a Bachelor of Laws from Dalhousie University in 1984.

Appointments to the country’s Superior Courts not only reflect the rich and diverse social fabric of our country, but also take into consideration the merit and legal excellence of each individual jurist. Through these appointments, the Government of Canada has demonstrated an awareness of the need to bring greater gender balance to the bench, to help ensure that the judiciary is more representative of Canadian society.

These appointments are effective immediately.

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New Judges Appointed to the Tax Court of Canada and the Federal Court of Appeal

Two New Judges Appointed to Tax Court of Canada

Two new judges have been appointed to the Tax Court of Canada.

From the news release published by the Department of Justice:

The Honourable Peter MacKay, P.C., Q.C., M.P. for Central Nova, Minister of Justice and Attorney General of Canada, today announced the following appointments:

The Honourable Don R. Sommerfeldt, a counsel with Dentons Canada LLP in Edmonton, is appointed a judge of the Tax Court of Canada, to replace Madam Justice G. Sheridan who resigned effective May 1, 2014.

Mr. Justice Sommerfeldt received a Bachelor of Arts and Science from the University of Lethbridge in 1972 and a Bachelor of Laws from the University of Alberta in 1977.  He also received a Master of Arts from Brigham Young University in 1974 and a Master of Laws from Cornell University in 2004.  He was admitted to the Bar of Alberta in 1978 and to the bar of New York in 2004.

Mr. Justice Sommerfeldt has been with Dentons Canada LLP (formerly Fraser Milner Casgrain LLP) since 2000.  Prior to that, he practised taxation, estate planning and pensions with Edward A. Zelinsky Professional Corporation; Cruickshank Karvellas; Milner Fenerty; the Department of National Revenue (Rulings Directorate) while on secondment from Milner & Steer.

Mr. Justice Sommerfeldt is a member of the following associations: the Canadian Tax Foundation and is a past governor; the Society of trust and Estate Practitioners, the Canadian Bar Association; the Canadian Association of Law Teachers; the International Fiscal Association; and the New York State Bar Association.

The Honourable Henry A. Visser, a lawyer with McInnes Cooper in Halifax, is appointed a judge of the Tax Court of Canada, to replace Madam Justice D. Campbell, who elected supernumerary status as of June 19, 2015.  This appointment is effective June 19, 2015.

Mr. Justice Visser received a Bachelor of Commerce from Dalhousie University in 1988 and a Bachelor of Laws from the Dalhousie Law School (now the Schulich School of Law) in 1994.  He was admitted to the Bar of Nova Scotia in 1995 and to Prince Edward Island in 1998.

Mr. Justice Visser has been a lawyer with the firm McInnes Cooper since 1997 and became a partner in 2003.  His main areas of practice were tax law, corporate law, commercial law, labour law and employment law.  He was employed with Martin Visser and Sons, farming and export business, from June 1995 to May 1997.

These appointments are effective immediately, unless indicated otherwise.

Two New Judges Appointed to Tax Court of Canada

Westerhoff and McCallum: More from the OCA on Expert Evidence

The Ontario Court of Appeal released its decision last week in Westerhof v. Gee Estate and McCallum v. Baker (2015 ONCA 206), which are the companion cases to Moore v. Getahun.  All three appeals were heard together.

The legal issue before the Court in Westerhof  and McCallum was whether participant experts and non-party experts could give opinion evidence without having to comply with Rule 53.03, which describes the deadlines and content requirements for expert reports.

The Court of Appeal held that the Divisional Court erred in concluding that the type of evidence – whether fact or opinion – is the key factor in determining to whom Rule 53.03 applies.

Rather, the Court of Appeal was unanimous in that participant experts and non-party experts may give opinion evidence without complying with Rule 53.03.  As a result, Rule 53.03 does not apply to the opinion evidence of a non-party expert or participant expert where he or she has formed a relevant opinion based on personal observations or examinations relating to the subject matter of the litigation for a purpose other than the litigation.

Background

At the trial of Mr. Westerhof, the plaintiff proposed to call evidence from nine medical witnesses.  From the outset, the trial judge ruled that the medical witnesses who treated or assessed the plaintiff but did not comply with Rule 53.03 would not be entitled to give opinion evidence concerning their diagnosis or prognosis, even though they had not been retained for the purpose of the litigation. Those witnesses were also prevented from giving evidence of the history they had taken from Westerhof. The Divisional Court upheld the trial judge’s conclusion.  The Court of Appeal did not agree and reversed the decision, ordering a new trial.

At the trial of Mr. McCallum, the defendant appealed that decision on the basis, inter alia, that the trial judge erred by allowing treating medical practitioners who had not complied with Rule 53.03 to give “an avalanche” of opinion evidence.  The Court of Appeal dismissed this appeal.

Principles set out by the Court of Appeal

Simmons J.A., writing on behalf of the Court of Appeal, concluded that a witness with special skill, knowledge, training or experience who has not been engaged by or on behalf of a party to the litigation may give opinion evidence for the truth of its contents without complying with Rule 53.03 where:

  • The opinion to be given is based on the witness’s observation of or participation in the events at issue; and
  • The witness formed the opinion to be given as part of the ordinary exercise of his or her skill, knowledge, training and experience while observing or participating in such events.

The Court also tried to clear the confusion that often arises from referring to these witnesses as “fact witnesses” because their evidence is derived from their observations of or involvement in the underlying facts.  Simmons J.A. preferred to refer to these witnesses as “participant experts,” which takes into account that in addition to providing evidence relating to their observations of the underlying facts, they may also give opinion evidence admissible for its truth.  As with all evidence, and especially opinion evidence, the Court reiterated that it retains its gatekeeper function in relation to opinion evidence from participant experts and non-party experts.

Six factors were cited by the Court as reasons why the Divisional Court erred:

  1. The Divisional Court failed to refer to a single case under the pre-2010 jurisprudence, which support the conclusion that Rule 53.03 does not apply to opinion evidence given by participant experts. The Court reiterated its view in Moore that “the 2010 amendments to rule 53.03 did not create new duties but rather codified and reinforced … basic common law principles.”  The Court found no basis for the Divisional Court to conclude that the pre-2010 jurisprudence did not continue to apply following the 2010 amendments to the Rules relating to expert witnesses.
  2. Apart from Westerhof, no cases were brought to the Court’s attention that support the view that participant experts are obliged to comply with Rule 53.03 when giving evidence concerning treatment opinions.
  3. There was nothing in Justice Osborne’s Report on the Civil Justice Reform Project that indicated an intention to address participant experts or non-party experts; rather, the focus was litigation experts – expert witnesses engaged by or on behalf of a party to provide opinion evidence in relation to a proceeding.
  4. The use of the words “expert engaged by or on behalf of a party to provide [opinion] evidence in relation to a proceeding” in Rule 4.1.01 and Form 53 makes it clear that an expert must be “engaged by or on behalf of a party to provide [opinion] evidence in relation to the proceeding before the rule applies.  The Court concluded that witnesses, albeit ones with expertise, testifying to opinions formed during their involved in a matter, do not come within this description.  They are not engaged by a party to form their opinions, and they do not form their opinions for the purpose of the litigation.
  5. The Court was not persuaded that disclosure problems exist in relation to the opinions of participant experts and non-party experts requiring that they comply with Rule 53.03.  Quite often, these experts will have prepared documents summarizing their opinions about the matter contemporaneously with their involved, which can be obtained as part of the discovery process.  In addition, it is open to a party to seek disclosure of any opinions, notes or records of participant experts and non-party experts the opposing party intends to rely on at trial.
  6. Requiring participant witnesses and non-party experts to comply with Rule 53.03 can only add to the cost of the litigation, create the possibility of delay because of potential difficulties in obtaining Rule 53.03 compliant reports, and add unnecessarily to the workload of persons not expected to have to write Rule 53.03 compliant reports.

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Westerhoff and McCallum: More from the OCA on Expert Evidence

Two New Judges Appointed to Tax Court of Canada

Two new judges have been appointed to the Tax Court of Canada.

From the news release published by the Department of Justice:

OTTAWA, February 6, 2015 – The Honourable Peter MacKay, P.C., Q.C., M.P. for Central Nova, Minister of Justice and Attorney General of Canada, today announced the following appointments:

The Honourable Dominique Lafleur, a lawyer with KPMG in Montreal is appointed a judge of the Tax Court of Canada to replace Madam Justice L. Lamarre, who has been appointed Associate Chief Justice of the Tax Court of Canada.

Madam Justice Lafleur received a Bachelor of Laws from the University of Montréal in 1989 and a Master’s degree in Taxation from the University of Sherbrooke in 1993. She was admitted to the Bar of Quebec in 1990.

Madam Justice Lafleur had been a lawyer with KPMG in Montreal since 2014. Prior to that, she had been counsel with Heenan Blaikie LLP, LLC in Montréal (1996-2014) and with Mendelson Rosentzveig Schacter (1991-96) working in the area of taxation. She had been a member of the consultative committee and Chair of Taxation and Public Finance at the University of Sherbrooke since 2006 and had been a speaker at study sessions and conferences on taxation for the Canadian Tax Foundation.

The Honourable Sylvain Ouimet, a lawyer with the Department of Justice Canada in Ottawa and Montreal is appointed a judge of the Tax Court of Canada to replace Mr. Justice P. Bédard, who resigned effective August 31, 2014.

Mr. Justice Ouimet received a Bachelor in Business Administration (Finance) from l’Université du Québec à Montréal in 1993 and a Bachelor of Laws from l’Université de Montréal in 1997. He also earned a “Certificat en initiation au droit français” from l’Université de Poitiers in France in 1996. He was admitted to the Bar of Quebec in 1999.

Mr. Justice Ouimet had been a lawyer with the Department of Justice’s Ottawa and Montreal offices working in the area of taxation since 2002. Previously, he had been a competition law officer for Industry Canada in Gatineau (2001-02) and an analyst for Laboratoires Abbott Limitée in Montreal (2000).

These appointments are effective immediately.

Two New Judges Appointed to Tax Court of Canada

Update: TCC and FCA Appointments

Tax Court of Canada

Associate Chief Justice Eugene Rossiter has been appointed as the next Chief Justice of the Tax Court of Canada. Justice Rossiter replaces current Chief Justice Gerald Rip, who has elected to become a Supernumerary Judge of the Tax Court.

Federal Court of Appeal

C. Michael Ryer has been appointed as a Judge of the Federal Court of Appeal. Justice Ryer served as Judge of the Court of Appeal from 2006 to 2009, after which he became counsel to Deloitte Tax Law LLP in Calgary. Justice Ryer replaces Justice Karen Sharlow, who retired from the Court in September 2014.

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Update: TCC and FCA Appointments

McKesson: Additional Submissions on Motion

“The Order and Reasons for Recusal do not and should not form part of the record before this Court. Their existence in the public domain does not compromise the ability of this Court to adjudicate the appeal or the appearance and reality of a fair process.”
-Crown’s Written Representations

In the most recent developments in the McKesson transfer pricing case, the Respondent has filed its Written Representations in response to the Appellant’s motion to raise new issues on appeal, and the Appellant has filed a Reply submission.

In the Written Representations, the Respondent has argued that the trial judge’s Order and Reasons for Recusal are irrelevant to the issues to be decided on appeal and do not properly form part of the record before the Federal Court of Appeal. The Respondent has also argued that the Order and Reasons for Recusal do not compromise the appearance and reality of a fair process in the appeal.

In its Reply, the Appellant has argued that the Respondent’s “remarkable position” that the Reasons for Recusal are not part of the record on appeal cannot be right. Rather, the Appellant argues, the Court of Appeal should perform a “meaningful review” of the Reasons for Recusal, as such reasons should not be “immune from review” or “shielded from appellate scrutiny”. The Appellant states, “The panel of this Court hearing the Appellant’s appeal must be given the opportunity to adjudicate [the Recusal Reasons’] legal effect.”

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McKesson: Additional Submissions on Motion

McKesson: Taxpayer Seeks to Raise Additional Issue on Appeal

“Judges are expected to decide cases as framed by the parties, then step back and allow the appellate process to unfold. In this case, the trial judge did neither.”
– Taxpayer’s Supplemental Memorandum of Fact and Law

The transfer pricing case of McKesson v. The Queen has raised procedural issues that are without precedent in Canadian tax cases. This week, those procedural issues became a central part of the matters that will be considered by the Federal Court of Appeal.

In a Notice of Motion (and other materials) filed this week, the taxpayer has asked for a new trial before the Tax Court.

Background

McKesson is a case involving transfer pricing adjustments under section 247 of the Income Tax Act (Canada) in respect of the factoring of accounts receivable as well as the limitation period in Article 9(3) of the Canada-Luxembourg Tax Convention. The Tax Court dismissed the taxpayer’s appeal.

After the taxpayer had commenced an appeal in the Federal Court of Appeal, Tax Court Justice Patrick Boyle recused himself (2014 TCC 266) from the two remaining issues before the lower court (i.e., costs and the content of the Tax Court’s public file) on the basis that the taxpayer had, in its materials filed in the Court of Appeal, accused of him of bias (see our previous post here).

Notice of Motion

On November 3, the taxpayer filed a Notice of Motion in the Federal Court of Appeal for leave to file (i) an Amended Notice of Appeal, and (ii) a Supplementary Memorandum of Fact and Law. In its Motion, the taxpayer states that Justice Boyle’s reasons for recusal raise a further ground of appeal in addition to those already set out in the original Notice of Appeal. The proposed Amended Notice of Appeal and Supplementary Memorandum of Fact and Law address the following additional ground of appeal:

Do the trial judge’s Recusal Reasons compromise the appearance and reality of a fair process in this case such that a new trial is necessary?

Specifically, the proposed Amended Notice of Appeal states,

8. The Trial Judge’s Reasons for Recusal dated September 4, 2014 interfere with the fairness of the appellate process and compromise the appearance and reality fairness of both the trial and appeal.

The taxpayer has also hired additional counsel in respect of the motion, namely Henein Hutchison LLP, a Toronto-based litigation law firm.

Taxpayer’s Arguments

The taxpayer’s Written Representations in support of its Motion argue that the recusal reasons were directed at the Court of Appeal and have compromised the fairness of the case. The taxpayer argues that this “improper intervention” has compromised the integrity of the appeal process.

The taxpayer’s Supplementary Memorandum of Fact and Law states that the trial judge’s “intervention in this appeal was ill-advised and improper”. The taxpayer argues that the trial judge should have remained “above the fray” and should not have “put himself into the appellate arena”.

The taxpayer characterizes the recusal reasons as a “post-hoc attempt to justify to an appellate court a decision given many months earlier” [emphasis in original]. The taxpayer states that the “Recusal Reasons are nothing less than an explicit attempt by the trial judge to insert himself into the appellate process as an advocate against the Appellant and its lawyers.”

The taxpayer argues that the recusal reasons must be considered part of the record in the case before the Federal Court of Appeal. A new trial would, in the taxpayer’s view, give it “an opportunity to make its case at trial, free of the unfairness that has now tainted this proceeding.”

The taxpayer also argued that the recusal reasons have undermined the solicitor-client relationship, and retrospectively reveal the trial judge’s disposition against the taxpayer.

The taxpayer has requested that the appeal be allowed and the matter remitted to the Tax Court for a new trial before a different judge.

*     *     *

The Crown has not yet filed its response to the taxpayer’s Notice of Motion.

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McKesson: Taxpayer Seeks to Raise Additional Issue on Appeal

McKesson: Trial Judge Recuses Self From Two Remaining Issues in Transfer Pricing Case

In McKesson v. The Queen (2014 TCC 266), Justice Patrick Boyle recused himself from the two remaining issues with which he was seized in the transfer pricing case – costs and the content of the court’s public file (i.e., the determination of whether certain information may be confidential).

This unusual decision arises as a result of the content of the Appellant’s factum filed in the Federal Court of Appeal in the appeal of Justice Boyle’s trial decision in McKesson (see our posts on the Tax Court case here and the Federal Court of Appeal proceeding here and here).

In his recusal reasons, Justice Boyle wrote:

[4]        As detailed below, I have, of my own motion, decided that I am compelled to consider whether I need to recuse myself from the two remaining issues before this Court. A consideration of this issue is required because I became aware that the Appellant and Appellant’s counsel, together with its co-counsel in the Federal Court of Appeal in respect of the appeal of the trial decision, had made certain public written statements about me in its factum in the Federal Court of Appeal (the “Factum”) which, upon reflection, appear to me to clearly include:

(i)         allegations that I was untruthful and deceitful in my Reasons;

(ii)         clear untruths about me, what I said and heard in the course of the trial, as well as the existence of evidentiary foundations supporting what I wrote in my Reasons; and

(iii)        allegations of impartiality on my part.

[5]        This requires me to consider whether:

(i)         I believe that a reasonable person reading the Factum, my Reasons, and the relevant portions of the transcript would believe that the trial judge so strongly complained of by McKesson Canada might not be able to remain impartial in his consideration of costs and confidential information;

(ii)         I believe I can impartially consider, weigh and decide the costs and confidential information issues before me; and

(iii)        whether the public challenge of my impartiality expressed by McKesson Canada and its co-counsel in the Factum is itself sufficient to warrant recusing myself at this stage.

 …

[133]     I view these as public allegations by a party to the costs and confidential information matters remaining before this Court that, regardless of the merits of their reasoning or their thoughts, I am unable to decide the remaining matters impartially. I believe that a reasonable person reading only these phrases from the Factum, without reviewing my Reasons or the trial Transcript, would believe that such strong complaints by McKesson Canada and its counsel may give rise to a serious doubt that I will be seen to be able to dispose of the two remaining issues and discharge my duties on an impartial basis.

[136]     For the Reasons identified above, I have decided I have to recuse myself from the remaining costs and confidential information issues in McKesson Canada’s proceeding in this Court.

[137]     It may be that some of the perceived untruths about the trial judge described above under heading II might individually not warrant recusal, and may be within an appellate advocate’s licence to overstate through the use of absolutes like ‘never’, ‘only’ and ‘any’.

[138]     However, I am satisfied that a reasonable fair-minded Canadian, informed and aware of all the issues addressed above, would entertain doubt that I could remain able to reach impartial decisions. I believe that such a reasonable fair-minded and informed person, viewing this realistically and practically would, after appropriate reflection, be left with a reasoned suspicion or apprehension of bias, actual or perceived. Canadians should rightly expect their trial judges to have broad shoulders and thick skins when a losing party appeals their decision, but I do not believe Canadians think that should extend to accusations of dishonesty by the judge, nor to untruths about the judge. Trial judges should not have to defend their honour and integrity from such inappropriate attacks. English is a very rich language; the Appellant and its counsel could have forcefully advanced their chosen grounds for appeal without the use of unqualified extreme statements which attack the personal or professional integrity of the trial judge.

[139]     For these reasons, I will be advising my Chief Justice that I am recusing myself from completing the McKesson Canada proceeding in the Tax Court. This extends to the consideration and disposition of the costs submissions of the parties in this case, as well as to the 2010 confidential information order of Justice Hogan in this case and its proper final implementation by the Tax Court and its Registry.

No date has been set for the hearing of the main matter by the Federal Court of Appeal.

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McKesson: Trial Judge Recuses Self From Two Remaining Issues in Transfer Pricing Case

U.S. Supreme Court Justice Scalia on Advocacy and Judging

The U.S. Supreme Court’s Fall term began on October 7, and there has been no shortage of recent articles on the docket and Judges of the Court. In a previous post, David Spiro noted a remarkable piece on U.S. Supreme Court Chief Justice John Roberts’ advocacy practice before he was appointed to the Court, and in a recent issue of New York Magazine, Justice Antonin Scalia provided his candid views on advocacy and judging.

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U.S. Supreme Court Justice Scalia on Advocacy and Judging

What Kind of Appellate Lawyer was Justice Roberts?

I first heard of John Roberts Jr. when he was nominated to the United States Supreme Court as Chief Justice.  I watched the coverage on C-SPAN which replayed a seminar that he gave to a group of law students on advocacy.  I was quite impressed – but not as impressed as I was after reading this article from The American Lawyer magazine.  Appellate advocates have much to learn from the Chief Justice of the United States:

http://www.americanlawyer.com/PubArticleTAL.jsp?id=1202620317367

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What Kind of Appellate Lawyer was Justice Roberts?